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Abstract: Ransomware is a particular form of cyber-attack in which a victim loses access to either his
electronic device or files unless he pays a ransom to criminals. A criminal’s ability to make money
from ransomware critically depends on victims believing that the criminal will honour ransom
payments. In this paper we explore the extent to which a criminal can build trust through reputation.
We demonstrate that there are situations in which it is optimal for the criminal to always return the
files and situations in which it is not. We argue that the ability to build reputation will depend on
how victims distinguish between different ransomware strands. If ransomware is to survive as a long
term revenue source for criminals then they need to find ways of building a good reputation.
Keywords: ransomware; repeated game; reputation; trust
1. Introduction
Broadly speaking, ransomware is a form of malware in which the victim of a cyber-attack is
blackmailed. The term has recently become synonymous with crypto-ransomware wherein the files
on a victims device are encrytped and a ransom is demanded for the key to decrypt those files [1–4].
While ransomware dates back to the AIDS Trojan in 1989, it has come to prominence over the last five
years or so with an explosion in the number of ransomware strands and victims [5]. Critical to this
rapid evolution has been the wider awareness of crypto-graphically sound techniques for encrypting
files in a way that does not allow reverse engineering [6]. Such techniques mean a victim has no way
of recovering encrypted files without a back-up or the private key held by the criminals.
Ransomware offers a viable, long term business model for criminals [7]. In particular, if a victim
has no back-up and values the encrypted files then they may decide the ransom is worth paying.
Survey evidence suggests that many businesses do indeed pay the ransom [8]. We also have evidence
of large profits for ransomware criminals [9,10]. The example of South Korean web-hosting firm
Nayana paying a $1 million ransom in 2017 amply demonstrates how lucrative ransomware can be
for criminals. Given that the probability of being prosecuted is low, it is no surprise that we now
see hundreds, if not thousands, of ransomware strands in the wild. Each strand may only last a few
months before the authorities and security experts ‘catch up’ but new variants continually emerge.
While ransomware offers a long-term business model it is clear that this model relies on an
element of trust between victim and criminal. Victims will only pay the ransom if they believe
that paying the ransom gives them a good enough chance of getting their files back [11]. This,
in turn, suggests that criminals would benefit from a reputation for honouring ransom payments.
CryptoLocker and CryptoWall are two examples of ransomware strands that had a good reputation
for returning files [12,13]. There are plenty of examples, like WannaCry, with a bad reputation.
So, should the criminal return the files, take the money and run, or simply demand more money?
Recent evidence suggests that victims who pay the ransom recover their data around 50% of the
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time [14].1 That may be enough to tempt victims to try their luck and pay up. So, have the criminals,
consciously or not, hit upon a good strategy?
In this paper we analyze reputation formation in a simplified repeated game. In each period a new
victim decides whether or not to pay the ransom and the criminal decides whether or not to return the
files. We assume that victims learn from the past experience of other victims. We also allow that it is
costly for the criminal to return access to files because of, say, the costs of a ‘customer service’ to guide
victims on how to decrypt files. In a baseline case where victims are unresponsive to past experience
we show that it is optimal for the criminal to not return files. In the other extreme where victims are
highly responsive to past experience the criminal should always return the files. We then explore the
middle ground to see where the tipping point lies above which it is optimal for the criminal to return
files. We find that if a criminal’s reputation will be based solely on their own actions then in all but
the most extreme settings it is optimal for the criminal to return the files. If, however, the criminal’s
reputation is affected by what other criminals are doing then it may not be optimal to return the files.
We will discuss the implications of our findings for law enforcement more as we proceed. But we
note here that the findings of this paper can help inform on the threat analysis of ransomware strands.
If a particular strand has a poor reputation then it would be in the interests of law enforcement to
advertise this, in order to undermine the business model of the criminals. Either way we would not
expect the strand to last long. By contrast, a strand with a good reputation has a viable long term future,
and so is of a higher threat. This may encourage copy-cats (who do not return files). Or it may be that
criminals join behind a ‘successful strand’, as with Cerber [15]. Or that ‘successful strands’ are ‘reborn’
in the game of cat and mouse with law enforcement and security experts, as we saw with Locky [16].
All this suggests that reputation is a factor that should go into threat analysis, alongside more familiar
factors such as the ease with which the strand can be detected by common anti-virus software.
Our work builds upon a number of papers using economics and game theory to analyze
ransomware. Hernandez-Castro et al. (2017) show how the optimal ransom demand depends on
the distribution of valuations in the population and the information criminals can discern about
willingness to pay [7]. Caulfield et al. (2019) analyze how criminals can learn over time about the
distribution of valuations in the population [17]. Caporusso et al. (2018) set out the basic rationale for
using game theory to model the interaction between ransomware criminal and victim [18]. Laszka et al.
(2017) consider the strategic role of back-ups [19] while Cartwright et al. (2019) look at the role of
irrational aggression and deterrence [20]. We recognize that there is also a related literature looking at
the game theory of hostage taking situations, typically framed in a terrorist context [20–23].
In none of the papers and models just mentioned is reputation explicitly modelled. Instead the
focus is more on criminal and victim interaction in a one-shot context or how criminals can learn over
time. The key contribution of our paper is, therefore, to move to a repeated game setting in which victims
can collectively learn from past experience. This moves the focus somewhat away from the criminal
onto how victims react to an attack. For instance, how do victims form beliefs and how does that
influence their decision to pay the ransom [24]. We would argue that such questions should critically
inform policy and advice on how to intervene in the ransomware business model. In particular,
the criminals have already had time to learn from experience about how to make ransomware work
and so can be expected to have a more sophisticated, forward looking strategy. To be ahead of the
game we need to understand optimal behaviour in this setting.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we provide the model, in Section 3 we have our results, and in
Section 4 we conclude.
1 Although it is not clear whether this is some criminals returning the files 100% of the time and some 0% of the time, or it is
mixing by a particular criminal.
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2. Model
There is a continuum of potential victims. Each victim i is characterized by the amount she values
her files vi. The population distribution of valuations is given by function q, where q(v), for any v ≥ 0,
is the proportion of victims who value their files more than v. We shall as an example consider the
linear distribution q(v) = a− bv, where a and b are parameters.2 In stage 1 of the game a victim is
randomly drawn from the population and her electronic device is attacked by a criminal. The victim
knows her valuation vi. The only information the criminal has is that vi is drawn from distribution q.
He does not, therefore, know vi.
In stage 2 of the game the criminal chooses a take-it-or-leave-it ransom demand r. In stage 3
of the game the victim decides whether or not to pay the ransom. Let p denote the victim’s choice,
where p = 1 indicates pay and p = 0 indicates not pay. In stage 4 of the game the criminal decides
whether or not to release the files back to the victim. Let g denote the criminal’s choice, where g = 1
indicates return and g = 0 indicates destroy. The payoff of the victim is given by
ui(vi, r, p, g) = vig− rp. (1)
For instance, the victims payoff is vi if she gets her files back without paying the ransom (which
could be equivalent to not being attacked) while her payoff is −r if she pays the ransom and does not
get her files back. The payoff of the criminal is given by
pi(vi, r, p, g) = rp− gc (2)
where c ≥ 0 is the cost of returning files. For instance, the criminal’s profit is r if the victim pays the
ransom and the criminal does not return the files.
Let us briefly comment on the interpretation of the cost parameter c. If the criminal can effortlessly
return a victim access to her files, c = 0, then it is a weakly dominant strategy for him to do so.
This makes it is ‘easy’ for the criminal to build a reputation. In reality, however, we can expect that
there are costs to returning access to files. These costs may include: checking the payment matches a
particular victim, returning the key to that victim, and, perhaps most importantly, guiding the victim
on how to decrypt their files and dealing with queries about files that fail to decrypt [13]. This latter
point is crucial in terms of reputation because giving back the private key is not enough—the files
need to be successfully recovered by the victim in order that she would feel the ransom payment
was honoured. Hence, c is likely to be positive. This provides an incentive for the criminal to not
return files.
In the following we assume that the above game is repeated indefinitely in periods t = 1, 2, . . . . Let
vt, gt, rt and pt denote the respective valuation and choices in period t. Given that victims are chosen
randomly a victim will only ever be a victim in one period. Victims are assumed to be self-focused and
so they ignore the externality effect that paying the ransom may have on future victims. Specifically,
the payoff of the victim in period t is
ut(vt, rt, pt, gt) = vtgt − rt pt. (3)
The criminal is forward-looking and discounts future payoffs with discount factor δ. His aggregate
payoff is thus
Π =∑
t
δtpi(vt, rt, pt, gt). (4)
We assume that the objective of the victim in period t is to maximize ut and the objective of the
criminal is to maximize Π. We also assume that both victims and criminal are risk neutral.
2 We restrict q(v) to lie in the interval [0, 1] as appropriate.
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Whether the victim is willing to pay the ransom will depend on his beliefs about the likelihood
of the criminal returning the files. Let βt ∈ [0, 1] denote the perceived probability of the criminal
returning the files in period t if the ransom is paid. For simplicity we assume that the victim believes
the probability of retrieving the files if the ransom is not paid is 0. Let history at time t be given by the
vector ht = {r1, p1, g1, . . . , rt−1, pt−1, gt−1} of past ransom demands, whether the ransom was paid,
and whether files were returned. We will assume that beliefs βt are a function of ht and rt.3 Clearly,
in reality, a victim would not have access to the complete history. Instead they would need to pick up
snippets of information from personal and social networks, forums, search engines etc.
To look at how beliefs may be shaped it is useful to relate our model to that on reputation in
repeated games. The basic model in this literature involves a long-lived player interacting with
a sequence of short lived players [25–27].4 For instance, a monopolist interacting with a sequence
of potential entrants [30,31]. The key question addressed in the literature is whether the long-lived
player has an incentive to generate a reputation. This could be a monopolist generating a reputation
for being tough against entrants or, in our case, a criminal generating a reputation for honouring
ransom payments.
Models of reputation are driven by some level of informational asymmetry between the long-lived
and short-lived players. One variant on the theme is a game of imperfect information and perfect
recall in which the short-lived players do not know the payoff function of the long-lived player but
can observe all actions. In our setting this can be equated with victims not knowing c and/or δ [30].
Or it could be the short-run players put some positive probability the criminal is a ‘commitment type’
who will always honour ransom payments [31,32]. In either case beliefs βt are shaped by history ht
because the past actions of the criminal reveal information about his type.
Throughout the following we take a partial equilibrium approach in which the criminal maximizes
expected payoff taking as given the beliefs of victims. This allows us to abstract away from formally
modelling incomplete information or equilibrium belief formation and focus on the incentives of the
criminal. It also means we do not restrict to ‘rational’ victims. In an Appendix A, however, we briefly
consider equilibrium belief formation and Bayes Nash equilibrium.
3. Results
As a trivial benchmark case let us begin with the case of independent beliefs in which βt is
independent of ht for all t. An assumption of independent beliefs is appropriate in a setting where
there are many strands of ransomware which are indistinguishable, or treated as indistinguishable
by victims. Hence, victims lump all ransomware attacks together and beliefs are based on the overall
probability of getting files back. In this case the criminal that we are modelling in our game would
have no (or very limited effect) on the beliefs of victims.5 It is simple to show that the criminal’s
optimal strategy is to never return files.
Proposition 1. In the case of independent beliefs, if c > 0 it is optimal for the criminal to set gt = 0 for all t.
Proof. For any period t we can see that the victim will pay the ransom if and only if rt < vtβt.
Consider a specific period τ in which the ransom is paid. Given that βt for all t > τ is independent of
gτ , returning the files costs the criminal c and has no benefit.
3 The victim observes rt before making her decision and so beliefs may also be conditioned on this. In our results this will not
be an issue because the ransom is constant over time. So in the text we use ht as shorthand for ht and rt.
4 A variation on this theme, less relevant to us, is a patient player interacting with a less patient player [28] or two long-lived
players interacting a finite number of times [29].
5 To formally capture this one would need a game with multiple criminals in which beliefs are shaped by the collective
behavior of independent criminals.
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Proposition 1 encapsulates the basic intuition that if reputation is irrelevant then criminals have
no incentive to return files. In this setting the only rational belief for victims is βt = 0. But, then victims
are not willing to pay and so ransomware is not profitable. We can already see in Proposition 1 that
reputation is vital if ransomware is to be a long term business model [11]. In particular, the ransomware
business model is dependent on beliefs, βt, being somehow tied with history, ht.
To appreciate the potential power of reputation let us consider another extreme. Suppose that we
have grim-trigger beliefs in which (1) βt = 0 if pt−1 = 1 and gt−1 = 0, (2) βt = βt−1 otherwise. In this
case, if the criminal once fails to return the files when a victim pays then no other victim will ever trust
him in the future. If the criminal always return the files then initial beliefs are retained.6 The following
result shows that it can be optimal for the criminal to return files.
Proposition 2. In the case of grim-trigger beliefs it is optimal for the criminal to set gt = 1 when pt = 1 for all
t if δ is sufficiently large.
Proof. Suppose that the criminal (a) charges a ransom r?t , where r
?
t > c and q(r
?
t β1) > 0, and (b) sets
gt = 1 if pt = 1, in all periods t. Consider period τ and suppose that the victim pays the ransom in this
period. Should the criminal return the files? The expected future payoff of the criminal if he returns
the files is
Πτ = r? − c + q(r?β1)(r? − c)
(
δ
1− δ
)
. (5)
If the criminal does not return the files his future payoff is Πτ = r?. It is, therefore, optimal to
return the files if
δ > δ =
c
q(r?β1)(r? − c) + c . (6)
It is clear that δ ∈ (0, 1).
To illustrate Propositions 1 and 2 consider the linear distribution q(v) = a− bv. In the case of
independent beliefs suppose beliefs are fixed βt = β1 for some initial belief β1. The expected profit of
the criminal if he sets ransom r? in each period t is
Π =
q(r?)r?
1− δ =
(a− br?)r?
1− δ . (7)
Hence we get optimal ransom demand
r? =
a
2b
. (8)
Consider next grim-trigger beliefs with the same initial belief β1. Suppose the criminal sets
ransom r?? and always returns the files if the ransom is paid. His expected payoff is
Π =
q(r??)(r?? − c)
1− δ =
(a− br??)(r?? − c)
1− δ . (9)
Here we get optimal ransom demand
r?? =
a + cb
2b
. (10)
Note that the optimal ransom is higher in the case of grim-trigger beliefs because the criminal
will pay the cost of returning the files. Returning the files is optimal (see the proof of Proposition 2) if
6 Grim-trigger beliefs are consistent with reputational models where a failure to return the files serves as a signal the criminal
is not a commitment type [25].
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δ > δ =
c
a−cb
2b + c
=
2bc
a + cb
. (11)
For plausible parameter values the value of δ is likely to be low. For instance, if a = b = 1 and
c = 0.01 we have δ = 0.02.
3.1. Sampling Recent Victims
Propositions 1 and 2 show that whether it is optimal for the criminal to return files will primarily
depend on belief formation. For the remainder of the paper we consider a particular model of belief
formation based on empirical frequencies. In motivating this approach we begin by recognizing that
there is an extensive literature on learning in games [33,34]. It is widely recognized that beliefs typically
do not obey Bayes rule (see Selten (1991) for an early, light-hearted take on the matter, with reference
to models of reputation [35]). Here we focus on a belief-based model of learning in which the victim’s
beliefs are based on the past record of the criminal in returning files. Our approach is similar to that of
Young (1993) [34,36] and consistent with beliefs being biased by event frequencies [37].
Our model of belief formation can be explained as follows. Given period τ and history hτ let
P(h(τ)) = {t : pt = 1} denote the subset of periods in which the ransom is paid. Let n be an exogenous
parameter that measures sample size. If |P(h(τ))| < n then we assume βτ = β1 for some initial beliefs
β1. If |P(h(τ))| ≥ n then denote by Pn(h(τ)) the n largest values in P(h(τ)), i.e., Pn(h(τ)) ⊂ P(h(τ))
are the most recent n periods in which the ransom was paid. We assume that
βτ =
1
n ∑t∈Pn(h(τ))
gt. (12)
In interpretation, this means that beliefs are based on the proportion of times the criminal returned
files the last n times the ransom was paid. So, we can think of victims as sampling the last n victims
who paid the ransom.7
The following result is analogous to Proposition 2 in showing that it can be optimal for the
criminal to return the files. This must be the case if sample size is small. The logic here is that it is
‘easy’ for the criminal to get a ‘bad reputation’ when the sample size is small, and once he has that
reputation nobody ever pays the ransom. So, the better long term strategy is to pay the ransom.
Proposition 3. If the sample size is n = 1 and δ is sufficiently large then it is optimal for the criminal to set
gt = 1 when pt = 1 for all t.
Proof. In period t we can see that the victim will pay the ransom if and only if rt < vtβt. Suppose that
the victim pays the ransom in period τ. If the criminal returns the files and continues with a strategy
of charging rτ and returning files, then his expected payoff in subsequent periods is
Π = rτ − c + q(rτ)(rτ − c)
(
δ
1− δ
)
. (13)
Note that this equation takes account of the fact βt = 1 for all t > τ. If the criminal does not
return the files his expected payoff is Π = rτ . This takes account of the fact that βt = 0 for all t > τ.
It is, therefore, optimal to return the file if δ > δ, where δ is as defined in the proof of Proposition 2.
7 In comparing our model to other models of belief-based learning we make the following remarks. Young (1993) allows that
the individual does not necessarily sample the last n events. This adds a further stochastic element. Other models allow the
past to gradually be forgotten and so recent events are given higher weight [38].
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Our next result shows that at the opposite limit of a large n it is not optimal to return the files to
every victim. In this case the large sample size means that the criminal can take the money and run
some of the time without it fundamentally influencing his reputation.
Proposition 4. For any δ < 1 there exists n such that if n > n it is not optimal for the criminal to set gt = 1
when pt = 1 for all t.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that a victim in period τ pays the ransom. Moreover,
assume the criminal has a perfect record of returning files and so βτ = 1. If the criminal returns the
files then his expected payoff in future periods is at most
Πo = r? − c + q(r?)(r? − c)
(
δ
1− δ
)
(14)
where r? is the optimal ransom for βt = 1. Fix a particular realization of values (vτ+1, vτ+2, . . . ).
Given this we can determine (pτ+1, pτ+2, . . . ) and (gτ+1, gτ+2, . . . ). Suppose that there exists some
period t at which point n subsequent victims have paid the ransom. That is ∑tt=τ+1 gt = n.
Now suppose that the criminal does not return the files in period τ but does continue to return
the files to those who pay in all subsequent periods t > τ. There will be at least n periods in which
we have beliefs βt = (n − 1)/n. In this case the victim will only pay if rt < vt(n − 1)/n. We set
rt = r?(n− 1)/n. Consider again the realization of values (vτ+1, vτ+2, . . . , vt). We have fixed things
so that (pτ+1, pτ+2, . . . , pt) and (gτ+1, gτ+2, . . . , gt) will remain unchanged. The only difference is the
lower ransom. The ‘drop’ in payoff compared to Πo is, therefore,
∆ =
t
∑
t=τ+1
δ(t−τ)gtr?
(
1− n− 1
n
)
=
t
∑
t=τ+1
δ(t−τ)gtr?
n
. (15)
This can be bounded
∆ ≤
τ+n
∑
t=τ+1
δ(t−τ)r?
n
=
r?δ(1− δn)
n(1− δ) . (16)
The ‘gain’ in payoff compared to Πo from not returning the files in period τ is c. For sufficiently
large n we have ∆ < c. Hence the criminal can increase his payoff.
In the proceeding we assumed that there existed some period t at which point n subsequent
victims have paid the ransom. Potentially one can have a realization of values where this is not the
case. Here, however, the drop in payoff from not returning the files is strictly less than ∆ (for t = τ+ n).
We observe, therefore, that irrespective of the sequences of valuations the criminal earns a payoff above
Πo if he does not return the files in period τ.
3.2. Simulation Results on Sample Size
Propositions 3 and 4 formally demonstrate that it may or may not be optimal for the criminal to
return files depending on how sensitive victim beliefs are to the criminal’s actions. We considered,
however, the relative extreme cases of n = 1 and n large. To explore what happens in the middle
ground we report the results of simulations in which we see how the profit of the criminal is influenced
by n. In the simulations we consider the linear distribution of valuations q(v) = 1− v.8 We track the
profits of the criminal over 1000 victims. Throughout we assume that victims start with the ‘optimistic’
initial belief β1 = 1 and then update beliefs according to Equation (12). Each data point is the average
of 1000 simulations.
8 Parameters a = b = 1 can be set without loss of generality.
Games 2019, 10, 26 8 of 14
We consider two variants on criminal strategy. Let us first explain our baseline random model.
This is characterized by an exogenous parameter w ∈ [0, 1]. For any period t, if the victim in period
t pays the ransom then the criminal returns the files with probability w. Moreover, the criminal sets
ransom demand
rt =
βt(1+ c)
2
(17)
which corresponds to the optimal ransom demand for beliefs βt. So, in our baseline model the criminal
will, over time, return the files 100w% of the time.
Our baseline model is somewhat biased by the effect which drives Proposition 3. To appreciate
why, suppose that there are n instances in a row where the criminal does not return the files. Then beliefs
will be zero and no victim will pay the ransom. This means the ‘bad reputation’ sits forever. To control
for this we consider a lower-bound model in which the criminal always guarantees that beliefs are at
least w. Specifically, for any period t, if the victim in period t pays the ransom then (1) the criminal
returns the files with probability w, unless (2) failure to return the files would result in beliefs falling
below w, i.e., it would be the case that βt+1 < w, in which case he returns the files, to make sure
βt+1 > w.
Consider first the case where the cost of returning files is c = 0.01 and the discount factor is δ = 1.
Figure 1 plots profit as a function of w for four different values of n. It is readily apparent that profit is
increasing in w. In other words the criminals profit is increasing in the likelihood of returning the files
and the optimal strategy is to always return files to those that pay the ransom.
Figure 1. Criminal’s profit as a function of w for four different values of n when c = 0.01 and δ = 1.
Figure 2 shows what happens if we increase the cost of returning files to c = 0.1 and lower the
discount factor to δ = 0.9. Here we see that, with the exception of n = 2, profits are highest when
w = 0 and so the criminal’s optimal strategy is to not return files. Note, however, that this finding is
critically dependent on two things: (1) a discount factor of 0.9 means the criminal is very much focused
on the short term, and (2) it takes time for victims to update beliefs. So, the criminal essentially exploits
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victims during the time it takes them to collectively learn about his strategy. Clearly, this strategy is
not consistent with a long term business model.
Figure 2. Criminal’s profit as a function of w for four different values of n when c = 0.1 and δ = 0.9.
To illustrate the criminal’s trade-off in choosing between a high and low probability of returning
files consider Figure 3. This plots profit over time for three different values of w when n = 100 and
c = 0.1. We can see that the strategy of never returning files w = 0 succeeds in the short run because it
takes time for victims to update beliefs. But, over the long run the strategy of always returning files
w = 1 is a clear winner.
Figure 3. Criminal’s profit over time for three different values of w when c = 0.1.
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You might think the short term advantage of setting w = 0 stems from our assumption that
victims are initially optimistic (with beliefs β1 = 1). This, however, is not the key factor. To illustrate,
Figure 4 shows what happens when we set β1 = 0.5. As you can see we get similar trade-offs across w.
The key factor driving the initial advantage of w = 0 is the time it takes for reputation to take hold.
The smaller is n the sooner reputations are formed and so the sooner profits are higher with w = 1.
Figure 4. Criminal’s profit over time for three different values of w when c = 0.1 and β1 = 0.5.
In summary, our simulations suggest that a criminal interested in maximizing overall profit will
take a long term view and always return files to victims that pay. We observed no gains from a strategy
that entails sometimes not returning the files. This suggests that Proposition 4 captures a very specific
case. Only the criminal interested in short term gains (low discount factor) would optimally choose to
not return files.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have looked at the incentives for ransomware criminals to return files to victims.
We have done so by studying a repeated game in which a criminal interacts with a new victim each
period. A victim is assumed to form beliefs based on the past actions of the criminal. In simple settings
we were able to obtain explicit results on when it is optimal for the criminal to always return the files
and when it is not. We then used simulations to further our understanding around this issue.
To summarize and interpret our results first imagine a world in which there was only one
ransomware criminal. In this setting the beliefs of victims will likely be shaped by the actions of the
criminal. If so, the criminal will do best to always return the files. This results from two different
factors (1) returning the files gives the criminal a ‘good reputation’, and (2) the criminal can benefit in
the long term from that good reputation. Only the most short term of criminals would take the money
and run. So, in this stylized setting incentives are clearly to return files.
In reality we know that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of competing ransomware strands.
So, next consider a world in which there is a large number of ransomware strands and no distinction
between them. Then it is difficult for the criminal to create a personalized reputation. Put another
way, the reputation of the criminal is likely to be influenced by factors outside of his control. In this
setting the optimal strategy is to not return the files. This, though, cannot succeed in the long run and
ultimately would mean that ransomware has no viable future [11]. In the short run, some victims will
no doubt keep on paying the ransom in the ‘hope’ of getting their files back. Ultimately, however,
the more news spreads that files are not returned the less trust there will be.
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As we discussed in the introduction, evidence suggests that victims recover files around 50%
of the time [14]. This would suggest we are somewhere in between the two polar cases discussed
above. Some ransomware criminals, we would suggest, are trying to create a good reputation for their
‘product’ to create a long term viable business model. Other criminals, by contrast, simply want to
cash in on short term gains and have no incentive to honour ransom payments. Indeed, we observe
fake ransomware that does not encrypt files at all [6]. This melting pot of competing motives could
influence the long-term evolution in ransomware in different ways.
If ransomware is to survive in the long term then the criminals behind a particular strand of
ransomware, call it Locky, would want to separate their reputation from that of other strands of
ransomware. In practical terms this means having a ‘brand’ that is recognized on search engines
or forums that victims may consult after attack. It also means the criminals behind Locky would
have an incentive to eliminate any competitors that may muddle their reputation. On the flip side,
competitors would have an incentive to imitate Locky so as to free-ride on their good reputation. So,
we could have a game of cat and mouse between competing criminal gangs.
From a law enforcement perspective things are somewhat complex. On the one hand if
they interfere in the reputation of Locky then this would undermine the business model of Locky.
For instance, law enforcement could frame things in a way that lowers victim’s beliefs about getting
their files back (without, necessarily, explicit deception). This would, hopefully, have the long run
effect of removing the criminal’s desire to continue with Locky. But, on the flip side, if Locky typically
does return files then there is a short term welfare loss of discouraging victims from paying the ransom
and getting their files back. So, there is a sense in which some victims have to sacrifice their own
interests to undermine the long-term business model.
It is interesting that current advice tends to skim over the likelihood of getting files back. This is
possibly because of a recognition that victims who are ‘desperate’ are going to be tempted to pay
the ransom. Other reasons for not paying the ransom are that the victim may be targeted more in
the future or may only get some of their files back before being asked for a larger ransom [4]. In our
model we have abstracted away from such issues but the basic insights from our paper still hold true.
In particular, victims are likely to be influenced by beliefs, whether that be the probability of getting
files back or the probability of the ransom increasing. The long term viability of ransomware relies on
a good reputation.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we look at how independent and grim-trigger beliefs can be consistent with
Bayes Nash equilibrium in a model with reputation.
Consider, first, grim-trigger beliefs. Suppose that there are two types of criminal: (1) A low-cost
criminal with cL = 0 and (2) A high-cost criminal with cH > 0. For the low type of criminal there is
a weakly dominant strategy to return the files. This could be interpreted as a commitment type who
will return the files [25]. A high-cost would prefer to not return the files if this could be done without
influencing the beliefs of future victims. Let z denote the prior probability the criminal is low-cost (and
1− z the probability high-cost).
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Informally, a Bayes Nash equilibrium in this setting consists of: (a) an optimal strategy for the
criminal given his type and the belief formation of victims, (b) an optimal strategy for victims given
their beliefs, and (c) victims form beliefs consistent with Bayes rule and the strategy of the criminal.
We introduce some preliminary notation. Given history hτ in period τ, let Lτ be an indicator
variable that takes value 1 if there is period t < τ, where pt = 1 and gt = 0 and takes value 0 otherwise.
Let Mτ be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if there is a period t < τ, where pt = 1 and takes
value 0 otherwise. In interpretation Lτ records if a victim paid and did not get her files back, and Mτ
records if any victim has paid. Also, let r?(β) denote the optimal ransom to set in a one-shot game
with beliefs equal to β.
It is simple to show that for δ sufficiently high the following is a Bayes Nash equilibrium with
grim-trigger beliefs:9 (a.i) Irrespective of type the criminal chooses ransom demand r?(1) in all periods.
(a.ii) Irrespective of type the criminal honours all ransomware payments, i.e., sets gt = 1 if pt = 1.
(b) The victim in period t chooses pt = 1 if vtβt > rt and chooses pt = 0 otherwise. (c) The victim in
period t has beliefs βt = 1 if Lt = 0 or βt = 0 if Lt = 1. Note that on the equilibrium path the criminal
always honours ransom payments and so victims expect him to honour ransom payments. Hence the
high type criminal maintains a good reputation.
It is simple to show that for δ sufficiently low the following is a Bayes Nash equilibrium with
grim-trigger beliefs: (a.i) Irrespective of type the criminal chooses ransom demand r?(βt) in all periods.
(a.ii) The low type criminal honours all ransomware payments, i.e., sets gt = 1 if pt = 1. The high type
criminal never honours ransom payments, i.e., sets gt = 0 if pt = 1. (b) The victim in period t chooses
pt = 1 if vtβt > rt and chooses pt = 0 otherwise. (c) The victim in period t has beliefs βt = z if Mt = 0,
beliefs βt = 0 if Lt = 1 and beliefs βt = 1 if Mt = 1 and Lt = 0 otherwise. Here we have a separating
equilibrium in which the low-cost criminal returns the files and a high-cost criminal does not. The first
time a victim pays the type of criminal is, therefore, revealed.
Finally, we provide an example with independent beliefs. In the previous example the low-cost
type had a weakly dominant strategy to return the files. Here assume that c is small but positive c > 0
for the low-cost criminal. Then both would prefer to not return the files if this would not change
beliefs. The following is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium: (a.i) Irrespective of type the criminal chooses
ransom demand r? in all periods (where r? can be any positive number). (a.ii) Irrespective of type the
criminal does not honour ransomware payments, i.e., sets gt = 0 if pt = 1. (b) The victim in period
t chooses pt = 1 if vtβt > rt and chooses pt = 0 otherwise. (c) The victim in period t has beliefs
βt = 0. This equilibrium is characterized by ‘pessimistic’ beliefs, which make it impossible to generate
a positive reputation.
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